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Abstract
In this expository paper we illustrate the generality of game theoretic prob-
ability protocols of Shafer and Vovk (2001) in finite-horizon discrete games. By
restricting ourselves to finite-horizon discrete games, we can explicitly describe how
discrete distributions with finite support and the discrete pricing formulas, such as
the Cox-Ross-Rubinstein formula, are naturally derived from game-theoretic prob-
ability protocols. Corresponding to any discrete distribution with finite support,
we construct a finite-horizon discrete game, a replicating strategy of Skeptic, and
a neutral forecasting strategy of Forecaster, such that the discrete distribution is
derived from the game. Construction of a replicating strategy is the same as in
the standard arbitrage arguments of pricing European options in the binomial tree
models. However the game theoretic framework is advantageous because no a priori
probabilistic assumption is needed.
Keywords and phrases : binomial distribution, Cox-Ross-Rubinstein formula, hyperge-
ometric distribution, lower price, Polya’s distribution, probability protocol, replicating
strategy, upper price
1 Introduction
In the game theoretic probability of Shafer and Vovk (2001), probability distributions
and probability models are not assumed a priori but derived as logical consequences of
certain protocol of a game between two players “Skeptic” and “Reality”. In this game
Skeptic tries to become rich by exploiting patterns in the moves of Reality. In order to
prevent Skeptic from becoming rich, Reality is in a sense forced to behave probabilistically.
Therefore probability distributions are determined by the protocol of the game. This
feature of the game theoretic probability is well illustrated by Shafer and Vovk (2001) in
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their derivation of Skeptic’s strategy forcing the strong law of large numbers (Chapter 3)
and the derivation of Black-Scholes formula (Chapter 9). Also in Takeuchi’s exposition of
the game theoretic probability and finance (Takeuchi (2004)) this point is discussed with
many interesting examples. Recently Kumon and Takemura (2005) gave a very simple
strategy forcing the strong law of large numbers.
In the standard stochastic derivation of option pricing formulas, empirical probability
is assumed first, but then by arbitrage arguments, the empirical probability is replaced by
the risk neutral probability and the price of an option is given as the expected value with
respect to the risk neutral probability. The risk neutral probability is often explained as
a purely operational device useful in expressing the option price in a convenient form.
On the other hand in the game theoretic probability the risk neutral probability is more
substantial, in the sense that Reality is forced to behave according to the risk neutral
probability to avoid arbitrage by Skeptic. We should mention here that in Shafer and
Vovk (2001) “forcing” is used only for infinite-horizon games. In this paper we somewhat
informally use the word to mean that Reality should avoid arbitrage by Skeptic in the
setting of finite-horizon games.
Additional flexibility of game theoretic probability is gained by introducing the third
player “Forecaster” into the game. At the beginning of each round Forecaster sets the
price for Reality’s move. By appropriately specifying the strategy of Forecaster, Reality’s
moves can be forced to follow any prespecified distribution.
In this paper we demonstrate the above features of the game theoretic probability in
the setting of finite-horizon discrete games. For expository purposes we start with the
simplest setting of the coin-tossing game and derive binomial distribution in Section 2
and give an analogous derivation of the Cox-Ross-Rubinstein formula in Section 3. We
discuss derivation of hypergeometric distribution and Polya’s distribution in Section 4
in order to illustrate the role of Forecaster. Then in Section 5 we discuss derivation of
an arbitrary discrete distribution with finite support. Multivariate extension is given in
Section 6. Some preliminary material on game theoretic probability is given in Appendix.
2 Derivation of binomial distribution
Consider the finite-horizon fair-coin game in Section 6.1 of Shafer and Vovk (2001). Its
protocol is given as follows.
Fair-Coin Game
Protocol:
K0 = α : given
FOR n = 1, . . . , N
Skeptic announces Mn ∈ R.
Reality announces xn ∈ {−1, 1}.
Kn := Kn−1 +Mnxn.
END FOR
In this protocol a game theoretic version of Chebyshev inequality is proved in (6.9) of
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S&V in the following form:
P
{∣∣∣∣SNN
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ
}
≥ 1−
1
Nǫ2
,
where SN = x1 + · · ·+ xN and P denotes the lower probability. Actually the equality of
the upper probability and the lower probability
P
{∣∣∣∣SNN
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ
}
= P¯
{∣∣∣∣SNN
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ
}
(1)
holds here and this probability is given by binomial distribution. Although this fact is
contained in a more general statement of Proposition 8.5 of S&V, we give a full proof of
this fact employing standard arbitrage arguments.
In order to treat success probability p 6= 1/2, let us consider the following biased-coin
game.
Biased-Coin Game
Protocol:
K0 = α ∈ R, a, b > 0: given
FOR n = 1, . . . , N
Skeptic announces Mn ∈ R.
Reality announces xn ∈ {a,−b}.
Kn := Kn−1 +Mnxn.
END FOR
As above we write Sn = x1 + · · · + xn. Let S0 = 0. Consider a random variable
x(ξ) = η(SN) which depends only on SN (European option). Then we have the following
basic result.
Theorem 2.1 The upper and the lower expected values of η(SN) coincide and given by
E¯(η(SN)) = E(η(SN)) =
N∑
m=0
(
N
m
)
pm(1− p)N−mη(ma− (N −m)b), (2)
where p = b/(a + b) is the risk neutral probability.
Proof: The first step of our proof consists of defining a “candidate” price of the
European option. In the second step we verify that the candidate price is actually the
precise price, by constructing a replicating strategy.
Let η¯(n, Sn), Sn = −nb,−(n−1)b+a, . . . na, denote the price of η(SN) at time n. We
require η(n, Sn) to satisfy the following “partial difference equation”
η¯(n, Sn) = pη¯(n + 1, Sn + a) + qη¯(n+ 1, Sn − b), 0 ≤ n < N, (3)
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where q = 1 − p. Note that (3) with p = 1/2 is a discrete version of the heat equation.
The terminal condition for η¯(n, Sn) is given by
η¯(N, SN) = η(SN), SN = ma− (N −m)b, m = 0, . . . , N. (4)
Starting with the terminal condition (4) we can solve for η¯(n, Sn) in (3) by backward
induction n = N − 1, N − 2, . . . , 0. Then the initial value η¯(0, 0) is easily calculated as
η¯(0, 0) = pη¯(1, a) + qη¯(1,−b)
= p(pη¯(2, 2a) + qη¯(2, a− b)) + q(pη¯(2, a− b) + qη¯(2,−2b))
= p2η¯(2, 2a) + 2pqη¯(2, a− b) + q2η¯(2,−2b)
= . . .
=
N∑
m=0
(
N
m
)
pm(1− p)N−mη(ma− (N −m)b).
Now we describe a replicating strategy for η(SN) with the the replicating initial capital
η¯(0, 0). For n = 1, . . . , N , let
Mn =
η¯(n, Sn−1 + a)− η¯(n, Sn−1 − b)
a+ b
. (5)
Note that a+ b can be written as
a+ b = (Sn−1 + a)− (Sn−1 − b).
Therefore Mn is the ratio of the increments of η¯(n,Sn) and Sn and is called the “delta
hedge”. We now check that thisMn gives a replicating strategy P. This can be confirmed
by forward induction. At the end of the first round n = 1,
η¯(0, 0) +KP1 = η¯(0, 0) +M1x1
= η¯(0, 0) +
η¯(1, a)− η¯(1,−b)
a+ b
x1
=
{
η¯(0, 0) + q(η¯(1, a)− η¯(1,−b)), if x1 = a,
η¯(0, 0)− p(η¯(1, a)− η¯(1,−b)), if x1 = −b
=
{
η¯(1, a), if x1 = a,
η¯(1,−b), if x1 = −b,
= η¯(1, S1).
Similarly at the end of round n = 2, we have
η¯(0, 0) +KP2 =
{
η¯(2, S1 + a), if x2 = a,
η¯(2, S1 − b), if x2 = −b,
= η¯(2, S2).
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Now by induction we arrive at
η¯(0, 0) +KPN = η¯(N, SN) = η(SN).
We have confirmed thatMn in (5) with the replicating initial capital (2) gives a replicating
strategy for η(SN). Hence the theorem holds by Proposition A.1 in Appendix. 
In particular if we take
η(SN) =
{
1, if |SN |/N ≤ ǫ,
0, otherwise,
we see that the equality holds in (1) and the probability is given by binomial distribution.
In this section we took Reality’s move space as {a,−b}. This is convenient in com-
paring Theorem 2.1 with the Cox-Ross-Rubinstein formula in the next section. However
for generalization of binomial distribution to hypergeometric distribution in Section 4, it
is more convenient to rescale Reality’s move space to {0, 1}. Then we need to introduce
the price p for the “ticket” xn. The rescaled protocol is written as follows.
Rescaled Biased-Coin Game
Protocol:
K0 = α, 0 < p < 1: given
FOR n = 1, . . . , N
Skeptic announces Mn ∈ R.
Reality announces xn ∈ {0, 1}.
Kn := Kn−1 +Mn(xn − p).
END FOR
It is clear that the biased-coin game and the rescaled biased-coin game is equivalent
by the affine correspondence xn ↔ (a + b)(xn − p), p = b/(a + b). In the rescaled version
the expected value in (2) is simply written as
E¯(η(SN)) = E(η(SN)) =
N∑
m=0
(
N
m
)
pm(1− p)N−mη(m). (6)
Furthermore, since the increment of Sn is normalized to be 1, the replicating strategy in
(5) is simply written as
Mn = η¯(n, Sn−1 + 1)− η¯(n, Sn−1). (7)
It is also conceptually very important to consider the single step game i.e. the game
with N = 1. Note that each round n of the N step biased-coin game can be viewed as
a single step game. In the single step game binomial distribution reduces to a Bernoulli
trial. This implies that given the price p, Reality’s move xn for each round n is exactly the
same as a single Bernoulli trial with success probability p. Furthermore this behavior of
Reality is dictated solely by the value of p, independently from the past moves x1, . . . , xn−1
of Reality. Therefore in the Rescaled Biased-Coin Game, Reality’s moves x1, . . . , xN are
independent Bernoulli trials.
5
3 Derivation of the Cox-Ross-Rubinstein formula
Here we present a game theoretic formulation and derivation of the Cox-Ross-Rubinstein
formula (Cox, Ross and Rubinstein (1979)), which is fully discussed in many introductory
textbooks on option pricing (e.g., Shreve (2004), Chapter 2 of Baxter and Rennie (1996),
Chapter 8 of Capin´ski and Zastawniak (2003)). Once an appropriate game is formulated,
the rest of the argument is the same as in the previous section.
Our protocol for Cox-Ross-Rubinstein game is as follows.
Cox-Ross-Rubinstein Game
Protocol:
S0 > 0, u > r > d > 0: given
FOR n = 1, . . . , N
Skeptic announces Mn ∈ R.
Reality announces xn ∈ {u, d}.
Sn := Sn−1 × xn.
Kn := Kn−1 +Mn(Sn − Sn−1) + (r − 1)(Kn−1 −MnSn−1).
END FOR
Here Kn−1−MnSn−1 is the amount of riskless bond held by Skeptic for the round n and
r − 1 is the fixed riskless interest rate. Although by appropriate discounting we may put
r = 1 without essential loss of generality (Section 12.1 of S&V), here we leave the interest
rate r as in standard derivation of the Cox-Ross-Rubinstein formula. p = (r− d)/(u− d)
is called the risk neutral probability.
Let η(SN) denote a payoff function of a European option depending on SN . Corre-
sponding to Theorem 2.1 we have the following result.
Theorem 3.1 (the Cox-Ross-Rubinstein formula) The upper and the lower expected
values of η(SN) coincide and given by
E¯(η(SN)) = E(η(SN)) =
1
rN
N∑
m=0
(
N
m
)
pm(1− p)N−mη(umdN−mS0), (8)
where p = (r − d)/(u− d) is the risk neutral probability.
Proof: As in the previous section we define η¯(n, Sn) by backward induction. Put
η¯(N, SN) = η(SN) and for n = N − 1, . . . , 0, define
η¯(n, Sn) =
1
r
(
pη¯(n+ 1, uSn) + (1− p)η¯(n + 1, dSn)
)
Then the initial value η¯(0, S0) is easily calculated as
η¯(0, S0) =
1
rN
N∑
m=0
(
N
m
)
pm(1− p)N−mη(umdN−mS0).
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This becomes the replicating initial capital of the following replicating strategy:
Mn =
η¯(n, uSn−1)− η¯(n, dSn−1)
(u− d)Sn−1
.
Since the game is coherent by the requirement u > r > d, the theorem follows from
Proposition A.1. 
4 Hypergeometric distribution and Polya’s distribu-
tion
In the rescaled biased-coin game of Section 2, the price p of the ticket xn was a constant.
Therefore the third player “Forecaster” did not enter the protocol. Now we introduce
Forecaster, who sets the price of the ticket at the beginning of each round in the rescaled
biased-coin game. We illustrate the role of Forecaster below by deriving the hypergeo-
metric distribution. We also derive Polya’s distribution.
Rescaled Biased-Coin Game With Forecaster
Protocol:
K0 = α: given
FOR n = 1, . . . , N
Forecaster announces pn ∈ R.
Skeptic announces Mn ∈ R.
Reality announces xn ∈ {0, 1}.
Kn := Kn−1 +Mn(xn − pn).
END FOR
Note that if Forecaster announces pn > 1 or pn < 0, then Skeptic can become infinitely
rich immediately by taking |Mn| arbitrarily large. Therefore we can restrict the move space
of Forecaster to be [0, 1]. Furthermore if pn = 0, Skeptic can still takeMn arbitrarily large,
which forces Reality to choose xn = 0. Similarly if pn = 1, then Reality is forced to choose
xn = 1.
Now consider a strategy of Forecaster. A strategy of Forecaster is called neutral (Sec-
tion 8.2 of S&V) if pn is determined by the past moves of Reality x1 . . . xn−1. From now on
we only consider neutral strategies for Forecaster. Furthermore for simplicity we consider
neutral strategy depending on Sn−1 = x1 + · · ·+ xn−1 and write pn = pn(Sn−1), which we
may call “Markovian neutral strategy”. In Markovian neutral strategy Forecaster only
needs to keep Sn−1 in memory to choose his move.
Consider an urn with ν1 red balls and ν2 black balls, where ν1 + ν2 ≥ N . Let xn = 1
correspond to drawing a red ball and let xn = 0 correspond to drawing a black ball from
the urn by Reality. Let pn be the ratio of red balls in the urn at the n-th round. Then
pn = pn(Sn−1) =
max(0, ν1 − Sn−1)
ν1 + ν2 − (n− 1)
.
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Actually here we do need to take the positive part of ν1 − Sn−1, because as remarked
above once the boundary Sn−1 = ν1 is attained, then 0 = pn = pn+1 = . . . and Reality is
forced to choose 0 = xn = xn+1 = . . . , which results in ν1 = Sn = Sn+1 = . . . . Now we
write out a game of sampling without replacement from an urn.
Game of Sampling Without Replacement From An Urn
Protocol:
K0 = α, ν1 > 0, ν2 > 0, ν1 + ν2 ≥ N , S0 = 0 : given
FOR n = 1, . . . , N
Forecaster announces pn = (ν1 − Sn−1)/(ν1 + ν2 − n + 1)
Skeptic announces Mn ∈ R.
Reality announces xn ∈ {0, 1}.
Kn := Kn−1 +Mn(xn − pn).
Sn := Sn−1 + xn.
END FOR
For this game the upper and the lower values of the payoff η(SN) coincide and are
given by the expected value with respect to the hypergeometric distribution:
E¯(η(SN)) = E(η(SN)) =
min(ν1,N)∑
m=max(0,N−ν2)
η(m)
(
ν1
m
)(
ν2
N−m
)
(
ν1+ν2
N
) . (9)
This result is actually almost obvious from the discussion at the end of Section 2, namely,
at each round n Reality’s move xn is like drawing a ball from an urn with ν1 − Sn−1 red
balls and ν2 − (n − 1 − Sn−1) black balls. However it is instructive to look at a formal
proof of (9).
Define a candidate price of η(SN) at time n by backward induction:
η¯(n, Sn) = pn+1(Sn)η¯(n+ 1, Sn + 1) + (1− pn+1(Sn))η¯(n + 1, Sn), n = N − 1, . . . , 0,
with the terminal condition η¯(N, SN) = η(SN). Then by fully expanding the recurrence
relation we have
η¯(0, 0) =
∑
(x1,...,xN )∈{0,1}
N
max(0,N−ν2)≤SN≤min(ν1,N)
N∏
n=1
pn(Sn−1)
xn(1− pn(Sn−1))
1−xnη(SN). (10)
Actually we do not need the restriction max(0, N−ν2) ≤ SN ≤ min(ν1, N) in the summa-
tion, because
∏N
n=1 pn(Sn−1)
xn(1 − pn(Sn−1))
1−xn = 0 for SN outside of this range. Now
8
it is easily seen that
N∏
n=1
pn(Sn−1)
xn(1− pn(Sn−1))
1−xn
=
ν1(ν1 − 1) · · · (ν1 − SN + 1) · ν2(ν2 − 1) · · · (ν2 −N + SN + 1)
(ν1 + ν2)(ν1 + ν2 − 1) · · · (ν1 + ν2 −N + 1)
=
ν1!
(ν1−SN )!
ν2!
(ν2−(N−SN ))!
(ν1+ν2)!
(ν1+ν2−N)!
.
Therefore
η¯(0, 0) =
∑
(x1,...,xN )∈{0,1}
N
max(0,N−ν2)≤SN≤min(ν1,N)
ν1!
(ν1−SN )!
ν2!
(ν2−(N−SN ))!
(ν1+ν2)!
(ν1+ν2−N)!
η(SN).
Now for a given value of SN , the summation just counts the number of ways of choosing
SN 1’s among x1, . . . , xN . It follows that
η¯(0, 0) =
∑
max(0,N−ν2)≤SN≤min(ν1,N)
N !
SN !(N − SN )!
ν1!
(ν1−SN )!
ν2!
(ν2−(N−SN ))!
(ν1+ν2)!
(ν1+ν2−N)!
η(SN),
which proves (9).
The above argument can be immediately applied to Polya’s urn model (Section V.2
of Feller (1968)). In this scheme, when a ball is drawn from an urn, it is replaced and,
moreover, c balls of the same color are added. Then the game corresponding to Polya’s
urn model differs from the game of sampling without replacement only in the specification
of Forecaster’s neutral strategy. In Polya’s urn model
pn = pn(Sn−1) =
ν1 + cSn−1
ν1 + ν2 + (n− 1)c
.
Then as in (2.4) of Section V.2 of Feller (1968), the expected value of η(SN) in this game
is written as
E¯(η(SN)) = E(η(SN)) =
N∑
m=0
η(m)
(
−ν1/c
m
)(
−ν2/c
N−m
)
(
−(ν1+ν2)/c
N
) , (11)
where the binomial coefficient
(
r
n
)
for a real r and nonnegative integer k denotes(
r
k
)
=
r(r − 1) · · · (r − k + 1)
k!
. (12)
Note that (6) and (9) are special cases of (11) with c = 0 and c = −1, respectively. In (9)
the range of summation can be taken as m = 0, . . . , N , with the convention (12).
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5 Arbitrary discrete distribution with finite support
So far we have discussed how to derive some classical distributions. We now show that
given any distribution on {0, . . . , N}, we can specify a neutral strategy of Forecaster in a
game with N rounds such that Reality follows the distribution.
Let qm ≥ 0, m = 0, . . . , N ,
∑N
m=0 qm = 1, denote an arbitrary probability distribution
on {0, . . . , N}. By decreasing N if necessary, we assume qN > 0. Define
q¯m =
qm + · · ·+ qN
qm−1 + qm + · · ·+ qN
, m = 1, . . . , N.
Then
qm = q¯1 · · · q¯m(1− q¯m+1), m = 1, . . . , N, q¯N+1 = 0. (13)
Let
pn =
{
q¯n, if Sn−1 = n− 1,
0, otherwise.
The idea here is to let Reality increase Sn−1 by 1 with probability q¯n−1 if Sn−1 = n − 1
or otherwise let him stop at the current level for the rest of the rounds. Note that
pn = pn(Sn−1) is indeed a function of Sn−1, because it is written as
pn = q¯n × I(Sn−1 = n− 1),
where I(·) is the indicator function.
Biased-Coin Game With Forecaster For Arbitrary Distribution
Protocol:
K0 = α, S0 = 0, qm ≥ 0, m = 0, . . . , N ,
∑N
m=0 qm = 1: given
FOR n = 1, . . . , N
Forecaster announces pn = q¯n × I(Sn−1 = n− 1).
Skeptic announces Mn ∈ R.
Reality announces xn ∈ {0, 1}.
Kn := Kn−1 +Mn(xn − pn).
Sn := Sn−1 + xn.
END FOR
The tree of this game is illustrated in Figure 1. For this game we have the following
result.
Theorem 5.1 The upper and the lower expected values of η(SN) coincide and given by
E¯(η(SN)) = E(η(SN)) =
N∑
m=0
η(m)qm. (14)
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Figure 1: Tree of the game for arbitrary distribution
Proof: As in the case of hypergeometric distribution
η¯(0, 0) =
∑
(x1,...,xN )∈{0,1}N
N∏
n=1
pn(Sn−1)
xn(1− pn(Sn−1))
1−xnη(SN).
In this game, the path leading to Sm is uniquely determined as
x1 . . . xN = 1 . . . 1 0 . . . 0
with m initial 1’s. By (13), for this path
∏N
n=1 pn(Sn−1)
xn(1 − pn(Sn−1))
1−xn = qm.
Therefore η¯(0, 0) =
∑N
m=0 η(m)qm. The replicating strategy confirming this candidate
price is given as
Mn =
{∑N
m=n η(m)qm∑N
m=n qm
− η(Sn−1), if Sn−1 = n− 1,
∞, otherwise.

In Theorem 5.1 we have considered a discrete distribution with the support {0, . . . , N}.
We can deal with the support of the form {a, a+1, . . . , b}, by letting N = b−a and setting
the initial value S0 = a.
In Section 8.3 of their book, Shafer and Vovk discuss “adding tickets” to make the
upper expected value and the lower expected value to coincide. Note that if Reality’s
move space has more than two elements in a single step game, then the upper expected
value is generally larger than the lower expected value. Theorem 5.1 shows that if we add
sufficient number of steps to a single step game, the equality of the upper and the lower
prices is achieved.
6 Multivariate extension
In the previous sections we have considered univariate random variable SN . In this section
we give a straightforward multivariate extension of the results of the previous sections. We
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employ the multi-label classification protocol discussed in Vovk, Nouretdinov, Takemura
and Shafer (2005).
Our extension corresponds to generalizing Binomial distribution to multinomial distri-
bution. Let SN = (S
1
N , . . . , S
d
N) be a d-dimensional vector. As in multinomial distribution,
for the sake of symmetry, we leave one-dimensional redundancy N = S1N + · · · + S
d
N in
the components of SN . Therefore xn in Rescaled Biased-Coin Game now corresponds to
a 2-dimensional vector (xn, 1−xn). For the general d-dimensional case the move space of
Reality
X = {e1, . . . , ed} = {(1, 0, . . . , 0), (0, 1, 0, . . . , 0), . . . , (0, . . . , 0, 1)}
consists of d standard coordinate vectors.
Multilabel Classification Game With Neutral Forecasting Strategy
Protocol:
K0 = α, S0 = 0 : given
FOR n = 1, . . . , N
Forecaster announces pn = pn(Sn−1) ∈ R
d.
Skeptic announces Mn ∈ R
d.
Reality announces xn ∈ X.
Kn := Kn−1 +Mn · (xn − pn).
Sn := Sn−1 + xn.
END FOR
Here “·” denotes the standard inner product of Rd.
In the above protocol we took the whole Rd as the move space of Forecaster. Let
∆(X) = {(p1, . . . , pd) | pi ≥ 0,
d∑
i=1
pi = 1}
denote the probability simplex spanned by the standard coordinate vectors. If Forecaster
announces pn 6∈ ∆(X), then by the hyperplane separation theorem Skeptic can choose
Mn ∈ R
d such that he becomes infinitely rich immediately, no matter what move Reality
chooses. See Vovk, Nouretdinov, Takemura and Shafer (2005) for a discussion of this
point. Therefore we can restrict Forecaster’s move space to the probability simplex ∆(X).
Also if pin = 0 for some i, Skeptic can choose M
i
n arbitrarily large and Reality is forced to
choose xin = 0.
We also note that there is a redundancy in the move space of Skeptic, once pn is
restricted to lie in ∆(X). Mn + c(1, . . . , 1) for any c ∈ R leads to the same increment
of the capital process Kn. However it is often convenient to ignore this redundancy in
specifying Reality’s move Mn.
For notational simplicity write
pxnn = (p
1
n)
x1n · · · (pdn)
xdn = pin for xn = ei.
As a straightforward generalization of results in the previous sections we have the following
theorem.
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Theorem 6.1 The upper and the lower expected values of η(SN) coincide and given by
E¯(η(SN)) = E(η(SN)) =
∑
(x1,...,xN )∈XN
N∏
n=1
pn(Sn−1)
xnη(SN). (15)
The line of the proof is the same as in the previous theorems and we omit the details.
The price η¯(n, Sn) at time n is defined recursively by
η¯(n, Sn) =
d∑
i=1
pin+1(Sn)η¯(n+ 1, Sn + ei)
and the replicating strategy M in is simply given by
M in = η¯(n, Sn−1 + ei).
From Theorem 6.1 we can easily derive multinomial distribution, multivariate hypergeo-
metric distribution as well as multivariate Polya’s distribution.
A generalization of Theorem 5.1 to an arbitrary (d − 1)-dimensional discrete distri-
bution of (S1N , . . . .S
d−1
N ) with finite support can be explained as follows. We first use
Theorem 5.1 on the first component S1n to derive the one-dimensional marginal distribu-
tion of S1N . Then, given the realization of the first component, we derive the conditional
distribution of S2N given S
1
N by another application of Theorem 5.1 to the second compo-
nent. We can continue this process up to the (d − 1)th component. The last component
Sdn is used as a slack variable.
Finally as an illustration of Theorem 6.1 we show how the Cox-Ross-Rubinstein for-
mula of Section 3 is reduced to our multivariate framework. Define
xn ≡
Sn − rSn−1
rn
.
Furthermore by discounting define
K∗n ≡
Kn
rn
.
Then the recurrence relation of the Cox-Ross-Rubinstein game
Kn = Kn−1 +Mn(Sn − Sn−1) + (r − 1)(Kn−1 −MnSn−1)
= rKn−1 + (Sn − rSn−1)Mn
is written as
K∗n = K
∗
n−1 +Mnxn.
Here xn can take two values
(x1n, x
2
n) =
(
Sn−1(u− r)
rn
,
Sn−1(d− r)
rn
)
.
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Rescaling the values we define d = 2, x∗n ∈ {e1, e2} = {(1, 0), (0, 1)} and
M∗n = (x
1
n, x
2
n),
p∗n =
(
−x2n
x1n − x
2
n
,
x1n
x1n − x
2
n
)
.
Then Mnxn is written as
Mnxn = M
∗
n · (x
∗
n − p
∗
n).
Therefore the iteration part of the the Cox-Ross-Rubinstein game is written as
FOR n = 1, . . . , N
Skeptic announces M∗n ∈ R
2.
Reality announces x∗n ∈ {e1, e2}.
K∗n := K
∗
n−1 +M
∗
n · (x
∗
n − p
∗
n).
END FOR
This shows that the Cox-Ross-Rubinstein formula is also a special case of our multi-
variate extension.
A Preliminaries on game theoretic probability
Here we summarize preliminary material (Chapter 1 of S&V) of the game theoretic prob-
ability. We also state a basic proposition on the existence of a replicating strategy and
the existence of the game theoretic expectation in a coherent game.
In this paper all the games are finite-horizon games with N rounds. Therefore a path
of the game is a finite sequence ξ = x1 . . . xN of Reality’s moves. A random variable
x(ξ) denotes a payoff to Skeptic, when Reality chooses the path ξ. Given a strategy P of
Skeptic, KP denotes the capital process of P with zero initial capital. Furthermore in this
paper we only consider symmetric games, in the sense that if P is a strategy of Skeptic,
then −P is also a strategy of Skeptic and
K−P = −KP .
The upper expected value E¯x and the lower expected value Ex of x is defined as
E¯x = inf{α | ∃P, ∀ξ, KPN(ξ) ≥ x(ξ)− α},
Ex = sup{α | ∃P, ∀ξ, KPN(ξ) ≥ α− x(ξ)}.
In a symmetric game Ex can also be written as
Ex = sup{α | ∃P, ∀ξ, α +KPN(ξ) ≤ x(ξ)}. (16)
A game is coherent if Skeptic is not allowed to make money for certain, i.e.,
∀P, ∃ξ, KPN(ξ) < 0.
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If a game is coherent, then E¯x ≥ Ex for every random variable x (Proposition 7.2 of
S&V).
We call P a replicating strategy for x with the replicating initial capital α ∈ R if
α +KPN(ξ) = x(ξ), ∀ξ.
We now state the following basic fact.
Proposition A.1 In a coherent symmetric game, suppose that P∗ is a replicating strategy
for x with the replicating initial capital α∗. Then
E¯x = Ex = α∗.
Proof: By definition of E¯x we have E¯x ≤ α∗. Furthermore in a symmetric game
Ex ≥ α∗ follows from (16). Therefore E¯x ≤ α∗ ≤ Ex. Combining this with the inequality
E¯x ≥ Ex we obtain the proposition. 
We should note that the proof of the inequality E¯x ≥ Ex in S&V and the above proof
are standard arbitrage arguments.
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